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Secret origins of the state: the structural basis
of raison d'etat
JUSTIN ROSENBERG
Introduction: the historical legitimation of Realism
The Italian city-state system occupies a special place in the canon of orthodox
international relations.1 For, as Martin Wight says, 'it was among the Italian powers
that feudal relationships first disappeared and the efficient, self-sufficient secular state
was evolved, and the Italian powers invented the diplomatic system'.2 And of course
this was not all they invented. In addition to the earliest modern discourse of
Realpolitik ('Machiavelli', Carr tells us, 'is the first important political realist'3),
it is in the Italian city-states that we find the first routine use of double-entry
book-keeping, of publicly traded state debt, of marine insurance, of sophisticated
instruments of credit (such as the bill of exchange), of commercial and banking
firms coordinating branch activity across the continent, and so on. Here, too, the
citizen militias gave way earliest to the mercenary armies that would later character-
ize European Absolutism; and within the town walls, a population given over
increasingly to commerce and manufacture elaborated new forms of urban class
conflict.
The list reads so much like a catalogue of modern institutions that it is almost
surprising to recall that the cultural self-definition of these polities was backward-
looking: they identified themselves with the cities of Classical antiquity, and their
innovations were framed within a yearning 'to walk back into the pure radiance of the
past'.4 The similarities between the Italian and the Greek cities are indeed striking,
by no means restricted to the humanists' recovery of the Classical heritage. For
the ancient cities too had developed a distinctive urban political culture and had
explored a range of governmental forms—monarchy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy
—recognizable in the evolution of the Italian towns. Both systems had high rates of
civic participation (linked originally in each case with a citizen militia), and both
experimented with sortition and short terms of office as a means of maintaining
the separation of private and public interests in the state. In exalting the political
community as the highest end of public morality, both elaborated secular ideologies
which contrasted with the cosmological self-understanding of the hierarchical poli-
1
 I am grateful to Simon Bromley and Fred Halliday for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
1
 Wight, Power Politics (Leicester, 1986), p. 30. This is a fleeting reference. Neither Wight, nor Bull,
nor Hinsley gives any systematic consideration to the question of what the conditions of this (by their
own account) world-historical development might have been.
3
 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London, 1946), p. 63.
4
 Petrarch, cited in Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974), p. 149.
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tical formations which surrounded them. Both embraced and depended upon trading
networks focused on maritime commerce, for which both developed extensive bodies
of maritime law. Above all for our purposes, both constituted miniature state-
systems.5 The classical world had no precedent for standing diplomacy, but it appears
to furnish a wealth of example and reflection—notably in the writings of Thucydides
—upon the rights and wrongs of state behaviour, the emergent balances of geo-
political competition within a multipolar system, and the elaboration of diplomatic
institutions for regulating interstate conflict in the face of threats from outside the
system. It was, and remains, the only known historical site of a premodern discourse
of raison d'etat.6
On the face of it, this paradoxical contrast may be a common enough feature of
historical change. Marx referred to a 'process of world-historical necromancy':
just when [people] appear to be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves
and their material surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet exist,
precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past
to help them; they borrow their names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new
world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed language.7
But for students of international relations, the dual identity of the Italian
city-states—dawn of the modern, echo of the ancient world—necessarily bears an
added significance. For it brings us face to face with that appearance of trans-
historical continuity between state-systems of vastly differing social structure which
Realism draws upon to support its claims for the geopolitical realm as sui generis.
These Realist historical credentials have led something of a charmed life within the
discipline. They are rarely challenged—perhaps because the 'timelessness' of the
Renaissance and Classical civilizations is taken so much for granted throughout the
humanities. Shakespeare, wrote his friend, Ben Jonson, 'was not of an age but for all
time!'. And what reader today could deny the same of Thucydides? Is not the
arresting 'modernity' of his prose precisely evidence of a timeless logic of inter-state
behaviour which forms the natural and distinctive starting point for IR theory? How
else is it to be accounted for?8
The ease with which these points follow on from each other perhaps explains (and
in turn is explained by) what seems at first a more puzzling circumstance: namely the
3
 Less commonly remarked is the reappearance in strength of another prominent classical institution:
slavery. Denys Hay (Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London, 1966), pp. 374-5)
suggests that in fourteenth-century Genoa, slaves may have accounted for 10 per cent of the
population. However, as Anderson emphasizes, these tended to be domestic servants, slave labour in
production being confined to the overseas sugar plantation and mining colonies (Absolutist State, p.
151).
6
 Wight asks (without finding any answer) whether certain schools of thought in the China of the
Warring States could provide another example. See his Systems of States (Leicester, 1977), p. 39.
7
 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Surveys from Exile (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 149.
8
 It is not at all obvious that the seeming familiarity of Italian and Greek geopolitics derives primarily
from the condition of a plurality of sovereignties which they share with our own system. Consider
the following. In the first third of the eleventh century, the collapse of the Caliphate of Cordoba in
the Iberian peninsular yielded 20 to 30 Moslem successor states (the taifa kingdoms) which proceeded
to spend several hundred years wheeling and dealing, fighting each other, making alliances,
organizing geopolitical balances and so on. But no one produces studies of the taifa state-system.
Conversely, when the Absolutist states of early modern Europe sought to redefine their sovereign
powers, they revived and modified the legal codes of a long-dead empire: Rome. Whatever it is that
we recognize as 'modern' in Rome but not in Moslem Spain, it cannot be 'anarchy'. On grounds of
straightforward empirical consistency therefore, the Realist claim that the latter captures what is most
distinctive and fundamental to our own modern geopolitics is rather suspect.
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paucity within IR of actual historical research into these premodern geopolitical
systems. Behind the countless casual references to the Italian and Greek city-states,
there lies no corpus of historical analysis and debate within IR. (Elsewhere, of course,
there is plenty, but in most cases it is not focused theoretically on 'the international
question'.) A couple of dry, legalistic surveys by Wight, the odd chapter or article here
and there on Greek or Italian political theory, two or three dusty volumes sleeping
peacefully on library shelves marked 'History of International Law'—is this really all
there is? Whatever other research has been done, it certainly keeps a very low profile.
This is not a live issue in international relations theory. But it ought to be.
What if Northern Italy did not see the genesis of the modern international
system? What if Thucydides did not offer a balance of power explanation of the
Peloponnesian War? And what if the existence of an 'autonomous realm of the
political', which indeed characterizes all three cases, can be shown to have rested not
on their shared 'external' identity as state-systems but rather on an internal (and in
each case different) structural configuration of social relations? The answer is that this
may not be just a little local difficulty with dispensible historical precedents: it may
bear directly on the adequacy of the dominant Realist theory of the modern system.
For it would show that this theory lacks the historical definition to which it pretends.
And ahistorical theories in the social sciences tend to suffer two persistent and
debilitating liabilities. First, they have no means of testing whether properties
assumed to be universal are in fact specific to a particular (usually contemporary)
epoch. This blots with anachronisms their image of the past. Second, without an
historical depth of field there is always the danger of posing as irreducible, essential
starting points, aspects of the modern world which are themselves outcomes requiring
explanation. Behind the veil of familiarity, the present too goes unexplained. In the
case of Realism, historical examples work precisely to stress the irreducibility of its
starting point (the autonomy of the political/the autonomous state), preempting
further analysis by demonstrating its elemental, transhistorical character. As Halliday
has pointed out, it is 'indeed paradoxical that a concept so central to the whole
discipline should escape explication as this one has'.9 For what if the autonomy of the
political is itself a contingent historical development? Would that not mean that a
crucial dimension of the modern system was opaque to Realism? And would we not
then stand in pressing need of an alternative explanation of the undoubted similarities
between the Classical, Renaissance and modern systems?
The aim of this paper then, is partly to call the Realist bluff by taking a closer look
at these premodern geopolitical systems: can we trust the historical references, or are
they hiding something? It will be argued in this connection that the historical terrain
often regarded as the stronghold of Realism is actually the site of its most spectacular
failures.
The argument is set out in the following manner. First, the early development of
the Italian city-state system is briefly reviewed, particular attention being given to the
emergence of a distinct public political sphere. This, it is suggested, was crucially
linked with the articulation of a discourse of raison d'etat. The next section recalls
Marx's discussion of the structural conditions of the rise of such a 'purely political
state'; and the paper then turns to consider how these conditions came to obtain in
the Italian case—through processes extending deep into the feudal world surrounding
9
 Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', Millennium, 16, 2 (1987),
p. 217.
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the city-states. This makes it possible to assess broadly the supposed Italian origins of
the modern system, before moving on to explore the structural basis of the 'purely
political' sphere in Classical Athens. Here again, the emergence of a recognizable
discourse of ration d'etat is traced not to the multipolarity of the geopolitical order,
but to the structural configuration of social relations organizing the material
reproduction of the society—in particular, the remarkable interdependence of democ-
racy and slavery; and this alternative analysis is then used to challenge the common
association of Thucydides with the Realist theory of the balance of power.
But the primary purpose is constructive; and it should perhaps be stressed again at
the outset that the final destination of the argument is neither Italy nor Greece but
rather our own modern international system whose actual historical identity is effaced
by the too easy rehearsal of transhistorical similarities. For if the generic properties of
states-systems will not suffice to explain the familiarity of Italy and Greece then, as
already suggested, they lose their credibility also as a starting point for understanding
the modern world. For this reason, the perspectives used below to explore the
premodern cases are, in the Conclusion, turned on the modern international system
itself in order to draw out their implications for IR theory in general. In short, it
is not enough to perform the usual expose and walk away. To secure the ground
we must pursue our methodological critique into the sketching of an alternative
historical explanation. We must give our own answer to the riddle of historical
appearances. And it must be a better one.
Italy
Political development of the commune
The independence of the medieval towns of northern Italy had been secured at a very
general level by the repulse of two German Imperial attempts to unify the peninsula
under feudal monarchy. In 1160 the citizen militias of the Lombard League defeated
the army of Frederick I (Barbarrossa). In the following century his grandson,
attacking from Sicily, set in chain the events leading to the complete destruction of
Hohenstauffen power in Italy. Both these campaigns assumed the form of the struggle
between Empire and Papacy.10 None the less, as Anderson suggests, it was a
cross-cutting dynamic, the precocious economic development of northern Italy,
which proved decisive in their outcome." Florence supplied not only troops for the
papal cause: its merchants raised the enormous loans which funded the Angevin
mercenary army that destroyed Frederick. In the decades which followed, French rule
fractured in the south (the Sicilian Vespers of 1282), while the papacy first removed to
Avignon (1309), returning in 1377 only to disable itself yet further by the Great
10
 The Communes were by no means united in their hostility to the Empire. Many of them had, after
all, sealed their independence from episcopal rule by winning Imperial recognition of their autonomy.
See D. Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 3rd edn (London, 1988), pp. 32-4. And the Papal-Imperial
contest would continue to provide the ideological form—though decreasingly the actual content—of
both geopolitical and internal factional conflicts for many years to come. On the Guelfs and the
Ghibellines, see Waley, City-Republics, pp. 145-56, who also gives instances where this diplomatic
partisanship continued to have a very real material basis—e.g. Florentine Guelfism (p. 148).
" Anderson, Absolutist State, p. 143.
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Schism of the following year. Outside intervention and influence in northern Italy by
no means ceased at this point, and the Ottoman threat in the east grew alarmingly in
the following century; but with the drastic weakening of both Papacy and Empire in
the peninsula, and France distracted by the Hundred Years War, the region enjoyed
a geopolitical seclusion that would last up until the French invasion of 1494.
Thereafter, the substantive independence of the city states was submerged again, first
under French then Hapsburg domination. It was the intervening 'Golden Age' (e.g.
1378-1494) which saw the innovation, along with much else, of 'the system of
organising interstate relationship(s) which Europe later adopted'.12
The complex of political communities which achieved this had of course already
undergone an extensive process of development by the time of the Great Schism. At
the start of the thirteenth century there were some two to three hundred more or less
independent communes: towns which had shaken off episcopal authority (mostly in
the seven decades up to 1150) and constituted themselves under the consular system
as self-governing merchant/landowning oligarchies.13 Their numbers had already
diminished considerably, as the combined effects of internal political instability,
competition over rural hinterlands and trade routes, and the inability to meet the
rising minimal military conditions of survival gave opportunity for expansion and
absorption. The twelfth century in particular saw an accelerated process of combined
external consolidation (the assertion of communal authority in the contado, or rural
hinterland) and evolution of internal political institutions.
Under these conditions the city-state system underwent not just a geopolitical
reorganization but also a decline of the consular political form. The consulates had
proved unstable in part because the leading merchant families which composed both
the commercial and the political elites carried their factional rivalry into the
institutions of town government already under pressure from the small-trader and
artisanal class below. The measures taken by the citizens' assemblies to preempt
the chronic risk involved in this arrangement constitute perhaps the single most
remarkable—and certainly the most revealing—aspect of the political development of
the commune. Terms of office were shortened (sometimes to as little as two months as
in the case of the priori making up the ruling council in Florence,14 more usually to six
months or a year)—with incumbents being ineligible (along with their entire families)
for immediate re-election. The representative character of key elections was per-
sistently diluted by adding in sortition rounds.15 Legislative initiative was dispersed
among a multitude of committees. And the highest judicial and military offices—
the podesteria (judge) and capitaneria (army commander)—were banned to native
residents altogether: their terms usually restricted to six months, they were filled by
candidates from outside who were rigorously vetted for remoteness of interest and
blood, and then tightly sequestered for the length of their office in order to preserve
their neutrality.16
12
 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Harmondsworth, 1965), p. 65.
13
 The ruling groups of the early communes were the major landholders; the later rise of trade did not
produce a landless commercial bourgeoisie (an index perhaps of the very weakness here of seigniorial
power). By contrast with the cities of northern Europe, 'the quintessential burgher . . . is not
identifiable' in Italy (Waley, City Republics, p. 118).
14
 G. Holmes, Europe: Hierarchy and Revolt 1320-1450 (London, 1975), p. 81.
15
 The procedure for the election of the Venetian Doge comprised no less than^ve sequent ballots, each
one (except the last) immediately stymied by a further selection by lot. See Hay, Europe, p. 120, and
the further examples, Waley, City-Republics, p. 37.
16
 See Waley, City-Republics, pp. 42-3.
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In short, and albeit with considerable variation in detail and extent between
individual towns, the communes attempted to insulate government from the private
power of individuals, to reconstitute the sphere of political life as an autonomous
public realm, to separate out the state as an institution: the podesta 'was not a ruler,
but rather he stood for the rule of law'.17
The public realm opened up by these developments was of course a restricted one.
Citizenship did not extend to the contado, where a subject population was compelled
to deliver monies, foodstuffs and military service to the commune. The abolition of
serfdom in the contado often signalled only the completion of communal domination;
in some ways indeed the towns were not so much anti-feudal as 'urban modalities of
the general mechanism for surplus extraction typical of the age, directed against
competing rural practitioners'.18 But the distinctive institutional form of the com-
mune did none the less have significant external aspects. One of these is captured in
Sereni's observation that 'Italian wars generally assumed the character of public wars,
that is, of real conflicts between states, while private wars were still very frequent in
the rest of Europe'.19 What is a public war? Perhaps an acceptable defintion would be:
one undertaken by or on behalf of a community, in which the goals pursued or
threats responded to concern collective interests. In a public war, the corporate
interests of the community (however these are ascertained) are assumed in principle
to be the highest moral end. It is therefore legitimated by raison d'etat in a way that
private wars cannot be. And private warfare does not refer only to the prosecution of
defiance by nobles. Any conflict formally undertaken in pursuit of individual material
and political aggrandizement is a private war. In this sense, even wars between
medieval monarchs remained private: their legitimation took the form of dynastic
claims (often appealing also to religious sanction); and the laws of war significantly
pertained to the conduct of individuals rather than collectivities such as states.20 This
gives rise to something of a paradox. In the course of a rivetting passage in
Renaissance Diplomacy, Garrett Mattingly declares that
in Italy, power was temporal in the strictest sense of the term. It was naked and free, without
even the most tenuous connection with eternity . . . [The communes were] the first
omnicompetent, amoral, sovereign states.21
By 'naked power' he refers mainly to the fact that the internal political constitution
of the commune was secular, wearing no sanction of religious legitimacy such as
adorned the hierarchical structures of the surrounding feudal world. Mattingly is of
course right to stress the permanent internal instability of the communes; but the
additional suggestion that brute force predominated in Italy as the irreplaceable
support of illegitimacy is slightly misleading. Was noble power in the countryside any
less brutal? And in one respect at least, was not the religious legitimation of feudal
domination required precisely by its private character, which otherwise would indeed
have appeared more 'naked' (in the sense of arbitrary and particularistic) than the
17
 Waley, City-Republics, p. 43.
18
 Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London, 1974), p. 192.
19
 A. Sereni, The Italian Conception of International Law (Columbia, 1943), p. 42.
20
 '. . . medieval treaty law was usually contained in the glosses and commentaries on contract law . . .
individuals rather than sovereign states were the principal subjects of international law . .. ' J. L.
Holgrefe, 'The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory', Review of International Studies,
15 (1989), pp. 13-14.
21
 Mattingly, Diplomacy, p. 53.
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internal political structures of the commune? (It is estimated that fully one third of
the free residents of the communes may have participated actively in the politics
and administration of their towns each year—a proportion equivalent to that in
Athens.22) The real point is that the 'naked' power that requires no religious sanction
may be despotic or usurpatious: or it may be public power, morally self-sufficient
because it appeals to an arena, real or ideal, of common interests.23 One index of this
possibility in Italy is the vigorous attachment to the rule of law, which also had an
external aspect: the cities agreed to continue observance of the municipal (cosmo-
politan) law of the Enpire even after Imperial authority waned: 'When the Emperor
was no longer recognised as superior, his place was taken by the law'.24 We shall
return to these themes below.
The standing embassies of later renown did not arise on a significant scale until the
latter half of the fifteenth century; but organized diplomatic interaction between the
communes was continuous and intense from the start. So much so, indeed, that
Waley suggests that 'the Commune of 1200 may be considered essentially the product
of such [external] relations'.25 In at least one sense this was often literally true: the
military efforts required both to suppress feudal power in the contado and to secure
new boundaries against attack from other Communes 'multiplied expenditure, hence
revenue' and were 'the main force which matured the cities' fiscal institutions'.26 But
beyond this, the material and organizational reproduction of the Communes was
carried on in significant part through their peacetime interaction by trade and joint
political coordination. The growth of traffic between the cities called forth and was
fostered by treaties extending reciprocal guarantees of the safety of communications,
the civil rights of foreign merchants and arrangements for extradition. Cities
negotiated about bilateral tariff concessions, the material facilities (warehouses etc.)
to be made available to each other's traders, the procedures for the settlement of
private disputes and so on. This in turn promoted an expansion of the apparatus of
government in general, and in particular required an 'exact determination of the
frontiers between the different states', leading often in turn to the appointment of
'magistrates charged with maintaining the boundaries'.27 Thus, by a symbiotic
process familiar to students of later Absolutist Europe, the heightened surveillance
within communal territories, which produced a sharpening of the territorial form of
the state, was increasingly both a function and a precondition of intercourse between
Communes.28
By the start of the thirteenth century, 'the podesta had become the rule rather than
the exception'.29 Yet it was from the beginning a precarious settlement. The town
nobles continued their violent feuding from their towers or from the exile where they
were not infrequently despatched in large groups. The tensions between the nobles
and the popolo could break out into open warfare. And to add to the manifold
22
 Waley, City-Republics, p. 68.
23
 For a brief but pregnant discussion of the operation of religious legitimation in hierarchical modes of
domination, see Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley, 1982), p. 83.
24
 Cited in Sereni, International Law, p. 14.
25
 Waley, City-Republics, p. 88.
26
 Waley, City-Republics, p. 49.
27
 Sereni, International Law, p. 11.
28
 Giddens observes the simultaneous and interlinked emergence of domestic and international political
structures with respect to the rise of the nation-state. See especially, The Nation-State and Violence
(Cambridge, 1985), chapter 4.
29
 Waley, City-Republics, p. 42.
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sources of inter-communal hostility, the peninsula as a whole was still (for the first
half of the century) disturbed by the intervention of Emperor and Pope. Many
Communes were increasingly obliged to place themselves under the military pro-
tection of local feudal lords. Even Florence, which retained its republican institutions
well into the fifteenth century, passed in and out of the protection of outside powers
no less than three times between 1313 and 1343.30 Elsewhere, the result was the rise of
the signori—often feudal magnates whose access to rural military and agrarian
resources supplied the leverage at a moment of crisis to transform their tenure of
podesteria or capitaneria into a permanent executive position.
The great republic of Milan fell to the Visconti just before the turn of the century,31
and by the 1320s the signori held power throughout most of the system.32 This
development further hastened the territorial concentration of the city-states while at
the same time arresting their political evolution. But it did not represent a straight-
forward reassertion of rural feudal power: the towns were now a curious amalgam of
merchant and noble forms. As Salzer put it: 'in the Signoria the two political
principles which had so long fought one another in Italy, Municipalism and
Feudalism [were] joined together'.33 And to a greater or lesser extent, signori found
that they had to rule through republican institutions.34 In the most remarkable
instance of sustained political autonomy, the effective rule of Cosimo de Medici over
Florence for three decades barely rippled the surface of republican government: the
private economic power by which he maintained his influence in the committees
provided the perfect counterpoint to the public sphere which he manipulated with
such skill.35
Sources of political autonomy
The word 'autonomous' has been used above to describe the emergence of Communal
political institutions. This is a loaded term in the literature of International Relations:
what exactly is meant by it here? It may help in answering this question to compare
Communal institutions with those characterizing the predominant, seigniorial form
of political power. For the most striking contrast is precisely that in the latter case
economic activity and the exercise of political authority are not separated out. The
heritable fief typically combines personal rights of appropriation over land and
productive labour with extensive political jurisdiction. On the one hand, the fief is
'owed' to the liege lord not as a public office but as a personally contracted
possession; on the other, it carries rights of economic exploitation which can be
30
 Holmes, Europe: Hierarchy, pp. 81-2.
31
 Matteo Visconti secured the Imperial Vicariate in 1294 (Hay, Europe, p. 167).
32
 Among the exceptions were Venice and Florence, which had expanded sufficiently to secure their own
defences.
33
 Cited in Waley, City-Republics, p. 158. For a discussion of the formal survival of republican
institutions, see Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York,
1979), p p . 102ff.
34
 Mar t i ne s observes tha t ' F o r all their original violence, signori knew tha t they could endure only by
regular is ing procedures a n d affecting t o side with the rule of law. . . T h e ma jo r legislative bodies
survived in nearly all the cities tha t fell subject to signorial ru le ' (Power and Imagination, p . 103).
35
 C o s i m o held supreme publ ic office for only three two-mon th terms dur ing the ent ire per iod of his
ascendancy . H e a r d e r & Waley, A Short History of Italy (Cambr idge , 1963), p . 85.
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exercised only through mechanisms of political command and subordination—
serfdom. There are thus no distinct 'political' and 'economic' realms. The emergence
of a public political sphere is blocked by the particularist, private character of
'parcellized sovereignty'; and the 'purely economic' relationships which constitute the
fabric of an 'economy' in the modern sense are precluded by the politically unfree
status of rural labour.
There is also therefore no state in the modern sense. There is a degree of intranoble
regulation provided by royal suzerainty; and there are more or less concerted
attempts to expand the scope of royal authority through the system of courts and the
contesting of ecclesiastical prerogative. There are legal codes and attempts to
consolidate centralized political rule. But 'there is as yet no political constitution as
distinct from the actual material state or the other content of the life of the nation'.36
Nothing could be more emblematic of this fusion than the role assumed by dynastic
diplomacy as a mechanism of accumulation and expansion in the geopolitics of the
age. This institution visibly depends for its operation upon the inseparability of
personal property and political jurisdiction—depends, that is, on the non-existence of
an autonomous state. Several other resultant peculiarities of feudal 'political' power
are frequently remarked—the recognition of private rights of warfare,37 the absence
of a distinct body of public international law and so on.38 One might add that in this
period the very reference of the term 'the state' was different, denoting something
closer to 'the civil state' later contrasted with 'the state of nature'. The modern sense,
a public political organization contrasted with 'civil society' is a much later arrival
again.39
Marx was from the earliest in no doubt that the social transformations registered
in the distance between these couplets—e.g. the emergence and reproduction of the
'autonomous' state on the one hand and the 'non-political' civil society on the
other—had to be seen as structurally interdependent:
The establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent
individuals—whose relations with one another depend on law, just as the relations of men in
the system of estates and guilds depended on privilege—is accomplished by one and the same
act."0
As Derek Sayer has argued, Marx's early writings repeatedly focus on the links
between the dominant mechanisms of surplus appropriation characteristic of the new
'civil society' and this reconstitution of political power as public authority.41 In
particular, Marx stresses that so long as the material reproduction of a social order is
organized through institutionalized political subjection, 'politics' cannot be dis-
engaged from privilege. Under these conditions, 'the unity of the state, and also the
consciousness, will and activity of this unity, the general power of the state, are
likewise bound to appear as the particular affair of a ruler'.42 It is only when 'the
36
 M a r x , 'Cr i t ique of Hegel ' s Rechtsphilosophie', repr inted in D . Sayer (eel.), Readings from Karl Marx
(London, 1989), p. 116.
37
 See Holzgrefe, 'Or igins ' , p . 12.
38
 Sereni, International Law.
39
 F o r a n i l luminat ing discussion of the historical evolut ion of the concept of society, see David Fr i sby
and Derek Sayer, Society (London , 1986), ch. 1.
40
 'On the Jewish Question', reprinted in Sayer (ed.), Readings, p. 125.
41
 See for example, D. Sayer, 'The Critique of Politics and Political Economy: Capitalism, Communism
and the State in Marx's Writings of the mid-1840s\ Sociological Review, 33 no. 2 (1985).
42
 Sayer (ed.), Readings, p. 124.
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political character of civil society is abolished (substituting non-political mechanisms
of surplus appropriation) that politics can assume a general, autonomous form in the
state, replacing the particularist private form of the estates. The overthrow of
feudalism
set free the political spirit, which had been, as it were, split up, partitioned and dispersed in
the various blind alleys of feudal society. It gathered the dispersed parts of the political spirit,
freed it from its intermixture with civil life, and established it as the sphere of the community,
the general concern of the nation, ideally independent of those particular elements of civil
life.43
Given the widespread assumption in IR (and elsewhere) that Marxism comprises a
theory of civil society which is incapable of apprehending the state except in
instrumentalist or reductionist terms, these passages are truly remarkable. For what
is being discussed here except the very state autonomy which, generalized into a
universal feature of political organisation, forms the cornerstone of Realist theory?
'The political spirit' can be nothing other than raison d'etat (an idiom indeed foreign
to the political discourses of feudalism). And these phrases—the general power of the
state . . . the political state . . . a real state . . . the state as such . . . the state [as] a
separate entity, beside and outside civil society'44—would not seem out of place on the
lips of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or any other writer arguing for 'the autonomy
of the political'. The difference of.course is that Marx does not regard this autonomy
as an attribute of institutions of rule sui generis; any exercise of government includes
general social functions and mobilizes collective powers; but the emergence of a
'purely political' sphere is an historical development which rests upon a determinate
structural configuration of social relations. Furthermore, this is not to be understood
simplistically as a causal autonomy of the state as an organization: it does not follow
that once a public political sphere has emerged, some imputed universal properties of
statehood could then provide a self-sufficient basis of substantive explanation of
historical outcomes. On the contrary, this is a theory of 'the autonomy of the
political' which begins by grounding our analysis of the state in a conception of the
social totality.
Italy and Europe
Is this then what was happening inside the walls of the Italian towns—and if so, does
it not merely confirm the conventional image of northern Italy as the advance guard
of the emerging modern states-system? This question requires that we supplement our
account of the internal characteristics of the Italian system with some observations on
its external integration into the wider social formation.
For the temporary geopolitical isolation of northern Italy from feudal Europe in
the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries does not, of course, mean that the
development of the city-state system took place in a vacuum. Rather the opposite is
true. Any attempt to picture what followed as the unfolding of'a little world by itself,
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an independent and self-contained system, would be drastically misleading.45 For the
city-states were at the very hub of the wheel of medieval medium- and long-distance
commerce. They virtually monopolized East-West trade, in large part through their
entrepots in the eastern Mediterranean (Venice) and the Black Sea (Genoa). And
these entrepots were not precarious footholds in a hostile, alien environment. In some
cases they were substantial territorial possessions in Asia Minor, continuously
sanctioned by diplomatic recognition within a thriving east Mediterranean state-
system.46
Venice had already been the principal conduit of western trade with Byzantium and
the Levant in the ninth century.47 (Formally still under Byzantine rule, she was far
better placed to penetrate eastern trade than were her rivals.48) It was, however, the
Crusades, with their fantastic opportunities for carrying and booty, which gave the
cities their chance. After the First Crusade (1096) Genoa, which had led the way in
providing direct naval assistance, acquired one third of the city of Caesaria and the
right to trade without duties and levies throughout the Crusader kingdoms.49 In the
century which followed, the Venetian colony of merchants in Constantinople grew to
number some ten thousand [sic] individuals.50 In the latter half of the twelfth century,
however, this tremendously lucrative trade was beset with crisis.51 The combination of
increased competition among European carriers at Byzantium and Alexandria
(forcing up supply prices) with persistent debasement of coinage by the European
monarchs (reducing the value of sales) produced a gradual squeeze on profits. Saladin
restored Moslem control over Palestine and Syria—leaving only a narrow coastal
strip to the Crusaders, (dependent upon Italian naval support), and provoking a
further reduction in trade due to papal bans on commercial intercourse between
Christians and Moslems. Finally, the Venetian traders at Constantinople were
enduring rising levels of violent resentment from their Byzantine competitors as
(Greek) Imperial protection weakened.
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Relief came with the Fourth Crusade, culminating in the fall of Constantinople in
1204. For the leading Italian city-states, the spoils gained by their participation in this
operation were nothing short of spectacular. Genoa founded the entrepot city of
Caffa on the Black Sea and was granted in addition 'vast neighbouring lands which
were veritable colonies'.52 Venice won (though, significantly, chose not to take
possession of) three-eighths of the territory of the Byzantine Empire and secured not
just monopoly rights but also the indirect rule of Constantinople for the next fifty
years.53 Venice and Genoa were to fight bitter naval wars over the next 100 years for
control of the eastern trade. But their prize was itself dependent upon a temporary
and shifting geopolitical conjuncture. In the following (fourteenth) century, direct
trading communication with the far East was broken with the collapse of the Mongol
Khanates. The diversion of this commerce into the hands of moslem seafarers
produced a further great increase in prices. As the Ottomans extended their sway in
Asia Minor, (finally capturing Constantinople in 1452), their fiscal demands further
depressed an East-West traffic which was already contracting due to the ravages of
the Black Death (apparently brought from Caffa by Genoese sailors) and renewed
papal restrictions on trade. A further, though temporary, challenge came from the
Portuguese, with the opening up of the sea-routes to the East: 'In 1504 when the
Venetian galleys arrived in Alexandria . . . they found not a single sack of pepper
waiting for them'.54
And yet the East-West trade was only one of four major axes on which the
integration of the city-states into the wider European social formation turned. A
second was their own production of manufactures—most saliently, textiles—for sale
both in Northern Europe and in the East. The livelihood of the tens of thousands of
artisans and labourers depended upon concentrating 'the thinly spread demand of an
entire continent'.55 And yet it remained the case that '[t]he Italians traded in other
people's products at least as much as their own'.56 And their industrial production
itself remained to the end in the service of trade.57 Thus, thirdly, colonies of Italian
merchants could be found in cities and towns all over Europe and the Levant. Ralph
Davis notes that 'In every considerable trading city south of the Baltic coastlands,
Italian trading settlements had been established—and there were no corresponding
northern settlements in Italy'.58 These merchants were often factors, or branch agents,
of companies based in Italy which coordinated a range of transactions in different
parts of the continent. (By 1300 the sedentary merchant had come to predominate
over his itinerant forbear.59) They represented a network of contacts through which
52
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large sums of money could be raised and financial credits transferred across long
distances without requiring the physical movement of specie. The bill of exchange,
(which could be issued and redeemed in different currencies) was the expression of
this facility through which 'to a large extent [they] dominated European trade'.60
There was, fourthly, an additional call on the liquidity available through these means:
Italian merchants/bankers (especially Florentine) handled the transfers involved in
the continent-wide activity of the Church, and they lent at interest on a large scale to
monarchs—usually in connection with the latter's military purposes.
This last practice involved not inconsiderable risks: when Edward III of England
defaulted on debts to the Bardi and Peruzzi companies which had been incurred in the
course of his French wars, the collapse of those companies (which were exposed to the
extent of fourteen times their share capital) so shook the prosperity of Florence that
the town had difficulty maintaining its own military expenditure.61 Holmes rightly
notes the apparent paradox
that the financial resources . . . of two private Florentine companies could exercise a decisive
influence in the policy of the King of England while, about the same time, the commune of
Florence placed itself under the government of a rather obscure French soldier of fortune,
Walter of Brienne.62
This is indeed a startling conjunction, and one moreover which is not much
illuminated by considering the size of the political units involved. If it is true that 'in
1293 the maritime taxes of the single port of Genoa yielded 3-J- times the entire royal
revenues of the French monarchy',63 then the geopolitical vulnerability of the
city-states is not obviously explained by saying that they were 'small fry in the world
of royal and seigniorial rivalries'.64
Any adequate historical explanation must begin instead with the way in which the
actual political and geopolitical independence of the Italian city-states was articulated
with the institutional separation of the processes of (agrarian) production and (urban)
exchange within European feudalism65 as a whole.
To the 'territorial states' of the north, land was (almost) everything: productive
labour, the source of their wealth, was (legally) rooted in it; and the political and
military command over this labour was the currency of seigniorial power. To the
city-states their territorial base was (almost) nominal. Of the Venetian it was said:
Non arat, non seminal, non vendemiat.66 While Florence, in the words of a near
contemporary, was 'powerful more by the advantage of its location, the capacities of
its men, and the readiness of its money than by the extent of its dominion'.67 This is
not of course to say that the towns did not have to secure the military and strategic
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conditions of their survival; and this almost always necessitated local and foreign
territorial expansion and, relatedly, the structural 'marriage of convenience' em-
bodied in the rise of the signori. But their real location, the site where they reproduced
themselves, was athwart the flows of exchange which serviced European feudalism
and which carried their citizens into every major town and court of the continent.
Insinuated thus 'into the pores' of seigniorial power, Italian merchants could
exercise considerable leverage based on their unique access to monetary flows68—
quite apart from the use-values which they supplied to the north.69 And this role was
undoubtedly enhanced by juridical and political autonomy at the centres of mer-
cantile accumulation. (Italy had its own cautionary examples of steep urban decline
under the heavy hand of Imperial or Angevin rule; and the Champagne fairs
themselves met an unnatural end, strangled by the Dukes of Burgundy.70)
But the same feudal separation of production and exchange which facilitated their
penetration into the heartlands of seigniorial power and allowed them to amass half
the traffic of the continent under their control without any significant northward
territorial expansion—this same separation also threatened to prevent the cities from
consolidating themselves geopolitically. Like the circuits of mercantile capital with
which they ringed Europe, the Italian cities remained crucially 'penned in the sphere
of circulation',71 relying heavily on external trade for their material reproduction—
and in some cases 'circulating' large sections of their population throughout the
continent.72 Thus although they were frequently at war, these wars were in general an
adjunct to their commercial reproduction, fought to secure the conditions and
expansion of trade. War was not, as it was for the feudal states, a primary mechanism
of accumulation:
The State eluded a comparable military definition, because competition in trade and
manufactures—escorted and enforced by extra-economic coercion, the 'protection costs' of
the age—had become an economic purpose of the community in its own right: markets and
loans were more important than prisoners, plunder was secondary to engrossment.73
Moreover, because of this, because their extreme urban definition was precisely a
measure of their necessary institutional subtraction from the rural feudalism which
they serviced, territorial expansion was not a natural avenue of growth, and always
carried the danger of providing geopolitical stability only at the price of republican
68
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autonomy. In practice, predominantly urban social orders of this kind, cut off from
the wider seigniorial political command over resources of productive and military
manpower, were historically unstable as independent states. Purchasing the military
services of local feudatories thus became the prelude to accepting the takeover of
Communal institutions by a noble landed family.
What was in many ways an intriguingly similar drama was later played out in the
United Provinces of the sixteenth century. There the parts of the Commune, the
podesta and the signor were played by the Estates-General, the Stadholder and the
House of Orange. In any fuller study, this would form an important additional
case—not least because it provided both (in Grotius) the theory of an international
rule of law and (somewhat later, in William of Orange) a candidate (already schooled
in the autonomy of Dutch political institutions) fit to smooth a crucial episode in the
consolidation of the institutional autonomy of the English state.
Returning, then, to the questions posed in the Introduction above: Was the Italian
balance the origin of our own international system? Is it true, as Mattingly suggests,
that
Italy first found the system of organizing interstate relationship[s] which Europe later
adopted, because Italy, towards the end of the Middle Ages, was already becoming what
later all Europe became.74
Any such claims would need to be severely qualified. In particular, the appearance of
continuity with later Europe is in many respects an optical illusion. The image of the
modern state-system beginning in Italy and then, through the collapse of the local
balance of power, drawing in other states and thus becoming generalized to Europe
as a whole, whence it later spread to cover the globe—this image is misleading. It is
inadequate even on straightforward empirical grounds. There is an important 150
year gap between the resumption of major foreign intervention in Italy (1494—which
Dehio marks as the start of the Europe-wide system) and the eventual construction
of multilateral standing diplomacy at Westphalia in 1648. Closer inspection of this
intervening period shows not only a fitful and restricted take-up of the Italian
methods, but also a significant regression in the evolution of the diplomatic system in
the ninety years leading up to Westphalia.75 In the 'international' sphere, as in the
development of its distinctive internal constitution, 'the city-state proved a dead-end
rather than the direct antecedent of the nation-state'.76
This conclusion becomes inescapable when we turn to the structural and historical
conditions of the Italian episode. The city-states indeed innovated 'purely political'
geopolitical networks (culminating in standing diplomac)') just as they innovated
many 'purely economic' ones (in the financial and commercial fields). The conditions
of each were the same: a radical institutional separation of politics and economics
premised upon a form of material reproduction dominated by exchange relations,
itself contingent upon a geo-commercial/structural location within feudalism which
enabled the cornering of such flows sufficient to support them. The very specificity of
this role meant that it could not be generalized to Europe as a whole. To rework
Mattingly's formulation: for the cities to look like what all Europe would later
become, they had to be released from the grip of seigniorial and Church power. But
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there was a clear limit to how many Venices and Florences there were room for
within Christendom. For Europe to undergo its transformation, Christendom had to
be destroyed. This process would reach its climax in the century and a half which
followed, producing a transformative crisis too in the underlying structural con-
ditions of existing diplomatic institutions.77 This is the unremarked historical content
of the 150 year gap noted above in the continuity of diplomatic evolution. And it was
not to be the work of merchant capital.
Greece
Peculiarities of the Greeks
The perception of 'the Greek city-state system' within IR has been a somewhat
confused and contradictory one. On the one hand, the causes and prosecution of the
Peloponnesian War are referred to as a locus classicus of the dynamics of the balance
of power.78 Thucydides is credited with being 'the first scientific student of inter-
national relations',79 'an early student of decision-making',80 and the father of
Realism—the latter often on account of his celebrated judgement that 'what made
war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in
Sparta'.81 Furthermore, Thucydides' portrayals of public debates and diplomatic
exchanges—most famously the Melian Dialogue82—pursue with a startling faith-
fulness the logic of realpolitik familiar from the modern Realist theory of the
state-system. So much is this so that in the Melian Dialogue itself—sometimes
invoked as the prototypical contest of Realism and Idealism—both sides accept
explicitly from the start that the issue will turn on the public interests of the parties
involved.
On the other hand, the exemplary status of the Greeks suffers a dramatic
downgrading at the hands of writers seeking to draw out their 'modern' character in
greater historical detail. Wight concludes bluntly: 'Just as they had no diplomatic
system and no public international law, so they had no sense of an equilibrium being
the foundation and as it were the constitution of international society.'83
To the evident disappointment of the English School, '[t]here was no Greek
Grotius'.84 Others too have been puzzled by a 'virtual absence of active theorizing
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about interstate relations' and have been led to speculate about treatises lost to
posterity or the exhaustion of the collective Greek mind following its exertions in
other areas.85 The feebleness of such speculation, and of Wight's conclusion too, is
readily apparent.86 But the confusion is after all grounded in a genuine paradox.
Purnell suggests that the lack of a developed theory of inter-state relations is partly
the result of a 'habit of referring to actual city-states as a body of people rather than
a named political unit'. This, he argues, 'limited the degree to which they could
theorize about relations between states as such'.87 But this apparent terminological
blockage reflected not a theoretical incapacity but rather a widely recognized
institutional reality: in classical Greece there were no 'states as such'. Anderson says
of Athens:
There was scarcely any separate or professional state apparatus in the city, whose political
structure was essentially defined by its rejection of specialised bodies of officials—civilian or
military—apart form the ordinary citizenry: Athenian democracy signified, precisely, the
refusal of any such division between 'state' and 'society'.88
Realpolitik without states? Whence then derives that public discourse ofraison d'etat
which is heard so clearly in the pages of The History of the Peloponnesian War? And
how is it that the Greek polis, which in its underlying character could hardly have
been more different from the Italian city-state of the Middle Ages, nonetheless bears
such a striking resemblance to it? If we can answer these questions we will begin to
penetrate the riddle of appearances on which the transhistorical claims of Realism are
founded.
The comparison of the Italians with the ancient Greeks has of course been run
many times,89 and the first and most emphatic contrast to emerge concerns the
absence in Greece of the role played by trade in medieval Italy. Not that trade was
unimportant: among the key mechanisms of Athenian, imperial power were the
enforced use by subject cities of Athenian currency, and the maintenance of
entrepot.90 But manufacturers for the most part 'had a purely internal significance,
not connected with inter-state affairs';91 and even if one includes the corn trade, which
seems to have accounted for the bulk of mercantile activity, 'the scale and total
volume were, small. . . even of the most highly urbanized communities like Athens'.92
Moreover, the traders and seafarers themselves were for the most part not citizens but
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foreigners and metics, often granted considerable rights of passage and settlement but
generally excluded from land-ownership.93 Mercantile and craft activity were held in a
low regard 'not unconnected with the servile status or ex-servile status of many of the
practitioners of retail trades'.94 Plato's ideal state of The Laws would have proscribed
the involvement of citizens in trade, and Sparta actually did so, delegating its craft
production and trading to the partly subject poleis of the perioeci.95
Unlike the Italian republics then, the classical city-states remained 'in origin and
principle, urban congeries of landowners'96—forming paradoxically an urban civiliz-
ation without an urban economy. The material and institutional conditions of this
development derived not from tapping the flows of inter-regional exchange, but
rather from the rural hyper-exploitation of captive labour: slavery. Considerable
disagreement persists as to the quantitative and qualitative weight of slave labour in
Greece. While Anderson suggests that slaves outnumbered the free in Periclean
Athens by 3:2,97 it is also the case that the heaviest concentrations were in mining and
domestic service, while in agriculture freemen were more numerous.98 Hence '[t]he
view of Athens as a community of leisured citizens whose slaves greatly outnumbered
the free is against the evidence'.99 This, however, is not quite the point. Slavery
'released from any economic concern, or even activity, the men who gave political
leadership to the state, and, in large measure, the intellectual leadership as well';100
but crucially, it did so in a way which did not require the political subjection of
fellow-citizens whatever polarisation of wealth might occur among them. Thus
slavery was not just a source of material surpluses; by providing a continuing supply
of cheap labour it acted also as a valve reducing the pressure on the economic
independence of the smallholding class which was the precondition of political
democracy. Slavery and democracy had in fact grown up together following the
abolition of debt peonage by the reforming tyrannies of the sixth century. Fittingly
enough, it seems that the first political democracy, Chios, was also the first significant
importer of slaves.101 And '[t]he full exploitation of slaves in Hellenic territory fell in
the blossom-time of democracy'.102
One has only to compare the Funeral Oration of Pericles with the speech of the
Venetian Doge on the resources of his city in 1421 (even granted the different
occasions) to sense the enormous cultural gulf between the two civilizations, reflecting
in turn the contrasted structural bases of their preeminence. Pericles' speech is a
eulogy of public political institutions, while 'the most beautiful garden of Venice'103 is
the 2,800,000 ducats of annual trade with Lombardy.104 These fundamental differ-
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ences can be elaborated to explore a range of sharp discontinuities between the Greek
and medieval Italian cities: the polis knew nothing of the structural antagonism of
town and country, pursued a militarist logic of accumulation alien to Italy, and so
on.105
Where the real institutional similarities none the less persist is in the forms of
political organization. Pericles lays great stress on the rule of law and the juridical
equality which it prescribes for the citizen body as an index of the achievement of
Athens.106 He expressed pride in the fact that his political influence was mediated by
the Assembly, and not exercised by virtue of any formal executive authority.107 And
while the citizen-wide eligibility for office did not prevent political power from being
largely the vocation of a wealthy, leisured minority, the latter were 'increasingly
servants of the state, instruments of the law, and not arbitrary wielders of power'.108
The language in which they addressed the Assembly was wholly of a piece with this:
The interests of the state were always justification enough, whether of war or of diplomacy
and negotiation or of capitulation (if necessary even to the Persians). The choice of
instruments in any given situation was arguable only on the question of tactics, pragmatically
but not morally.109
Again and again Thucydides gives witness of this in set piece debates—for example
the Mytilenian Debate on the efficacy of mass capital punishment, where Cleon's
opening hard line is countered not by moral objection but by Diodotus' subtler
expediency.110 But what is this 'state' whose interests are invoked as paramount? As
we have already noted, it does not have any existence other than the political
self-organization of the citizenry.1" It has no bureaucratic apparatus to which the
decision-making authority of the populace is formally alienated and which might
provide a basis of 'independent' interests and capacities. It is anything but autono-
mous in this restricted empirical sense. And yet it talks like a state! This suggests that
the underlying constituents of raison d'etat may lie elsewhere—not in the existence of
a separate.state organization but in a particular social relation among the population.
In Athens this was transparently so. In every sense, the democracy depended upon
the institutional exclusion from the political sphere of those social relationships of
juridical inequality (namely slavery and the metic status of trade) by which surplus
extraction from direct producers and the security of small-holders in the face of
commercial wealth were maintained. Thus, from the point of view of the population
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as a whole 'civil society was the slave of political society'."2 Among the citizen body
however, the effect was to 'set free the political spirit': 'in Greece, the respublica is the
real private affair of the citizens, their real content... the political state qua political
state, being the true and only content of the life and will of the citizens'."3 For the
citizenry, the political realm was, whatever divisions of wealth it encompassed,
objectively the realm of their deeper common interest—truly a public sphere, albeit
one whose structural conditions rendered it incapable of extension beyond a minority
of the population. Within this sphere, a discourse of raison d'etat could flourish
because the formal equality of its members made it possible for issues to appear in
their 'purely political' technical aspect. (This is not of course to imply substantive
unity within Greek democratic assemblies, which were on the contrary, generally
riven with the most vigorous factional strife—as indeed is the public sphere in 'open'
societies today: the point is the existence of a public sphere at all.) But the referent and
ground of this discourse was not a bureaucratic state organization; it was the nexus
of internal and external social relations which produced and reproduced their
ascendency in the role of a 'purely political' elite. At the end of our long trail back
through history in pursuit of the elemental category of Realist theory, we have arrived
at an 'autonomy of the political' (e.g. the separating out of a distinct sphere of 'the
political') without a state.
Excursus: causes of the Peloponnesian War
Before examining the implications of this for our understanding of the modern state,
we might take this opportunity to assess briefly the claim that Thucydides provides a
Realist explanation of the Peloponnesian War in terms of the balance of power.
As Doyle has argued, the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues ranged against each
other differed fundamentally in both the political complexion of the poleis involved
and the mechanisms of interstate control which held them together. Athens had
assumed leadership of the Delian League in 487 BC determined to press forward the
expulsion of the Persians following the naval victory at Salamis and the freeing of
Ionia. In this she was beckoned on not only by the opportunities for plunder,
enslavement and colonization which attended each engagement; she also sought to
secure the sea-routes for the corn imports from the Black Sea on which she was
becoming increasingly dependent. (Athenian leadership took over from that of
Sparta, which, by contrast, supplied most of its cereal needs from domestic pro-
duction, and, for reasons detailed below, could ill afford large and prolonged military
deployment abroad."4) The League began as a voluntary association to which each
polis supplied an agreed 'tribute' of ships and men or money. It was transformed into
an empire as the Athenians forcibly prevented secession (beginning with Naxos in
469), transferred the treasury from Delos to Athens (454), suppressed independent
naval activity and assumed an ever closer supervision of the payment of the tribute.
In its most developed form, this was accompanied by the arrogation to Athenian
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courts of all capital trials in member cities as well as the proliferation of Athenian
currency minted from the silver mines at Laurium, and the maintenance of the
port of Piraeus as a compulsory entrepot for all Greek imports of corn from South
Russia. The exercise of Athenian power facilitated by these arrangements took three
principal forms: an effective naval monopoly permitting (in a predominantly coastal
civilization) direct military sanctions against recalcitrant poleis; a political hegemony
over allied democratic factions dependent on Athenian support against oligarchic
revanchism; and a commercial supremacy which distributed the benefits of reduced
piracy and a guaranteed currency while concentrating regulative authority. (Hopper
observes that Athens 'learnt to use [her] control over corn and ship timber as
instruments of domination over other states'. At the same time she could '. . .
virtually close, for an individual, the majority of the Greek ports of importance in
the eastern Mediterranean'."5)
It was otherwise in the Peloponnesian League, for reasons closely connected with
the internal peculiarities of the Spartan polis. After a precocious early political
development in the Archaic period, the evolution of the Spartan polis had arrested in
a rigid oligarchic form which it was to retain for over 300 years. This was largely due
to the fact that, whereas enslaved communities were normally dispersed on capture
through the fully commodified slavery practised by poleis such as Athens, the
Spartans had opted to exploit their subject populations in Laconia and Messenia in
situ. The continuous occupation of these areas placed extreme military demands on
the citizenry who organized themselves into a permanently mobilized army—a
development finalized following the Second Messenian War of the third quarter of the
seventh century. Thus, enigmatically, Sparta's 'great power' role arose out of her
internal instability and remained connected with it: 'Her first and only unwavering
concern was peace at home, in the Peloponnese. This she never fully achieved, but she
came near enough through the instrumentality of the Peloponnesian League.'"6 This
inward orientation of the Spartans' policy, for which they were roundly criticized by
their allies,"7 is witnessed also by the fact that the League was not an empire, an
interstate and 'transnational' mechanism for surplus accumulation at the metro-
pole."8 Thucydides says that 'The Spartans did not make their allies pay tribute, but
saw to it that they were governed by oligarchies who would work in the Spartan
interest'."9 Nor was this interest pursued through the imposition of preferential trading
arrangements. On the contrary, the oligarchies such as Sparta 'sought to avoid
commercial contact in order to prevent the mobilisation of their democratically
inclined middle and lower classes'.120 Spartan military prowess, coupled with a fear of
being undermined domestically by the influence of the politically more advanced
poleis to the east—these were the principal forces which held the league of oligarchies
together and made it the natural pole of attraction for Athens' other rivals too. The
latter knew well how to play on the underlying conflict of social systems. '[Y]our
whole way of life is out of date when compared to theirs', declared the Corinthian
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delegates, goading the Spartan Assembly into war; 'Athens, because of the very
variety of her experience, is a far more modern state than you are'.121 This was no
revelation. Sparta found it difficult enough to live with Athens even when the latter
was providing friendly military assistance: the Athenian army sent in response to
Spartan requests for aid in putting down the helot revolt of 464 was sent home early
for fear they might 'become the sponsors of some revolutionary policy'.122
What then was 'the real reason for the war'? Was it the perceived tipping of the
military and geopolitical scales between the two alliances threatened by the Athenian
takeovers in Corcyra and Potidaea?123 Or do these incidents, however central to the
mechanisms of escalation, belong rather among those factors by which 'the real
reason' is 'most likely to be disguised'? Was it the wider conflict of social systems
which generated incompatible external needs?
Athens was securing her position in many of the subject cities by supporting democrats . . .
against former governing classes . . . Conversely, there were unprivileged classes in some
mainland states who looked longingly towards Athens. It was this which made it difficult for
the two power-blocs, representing different social systems, to lie down together.124
Or can it be grasped only by Thucydides' most comprehensive category of historical
explanation, the 'uneven development' of Greece as a whole, as a result of which 'up
to the present day much of Hellas still follows the old way of life',125 with all the
strains and intercommunal tensions which followed from this?
Whatever the answer, one thing at least must be allowed: when Thucydides
describes 'the real reason' as 'the growth of Athenian power', he does not, could not,
mean geopolitical power on the modern realist definition—the fungible, strictly
interstate, transhistorically generic medium of the 'balance of power'. For on his own
account, the Athenian threat comprised qualitatively distinct forms of influence and
control which Sparta could not reproduce, even in smaller quantities.126 Moreover, its
external geopolitical advance was inseparable from the sociopolitical vulnerability
which it compounded within the Spartan polls. In other words, we find here neither a
common structural definition to the forms of geopolitical power exercised by the two
alliances, nor a distinct terrain of inter-state politics whose dynamics could be
analysed sui generis. Given this, it becomes difficult to see what 'the balance of power'
as an explanatory tool (rather than as a piece of descriptive shorthand) could refer to
except purely military logics of escalation. And no one, least of all Thucydides, would
reduce the causes of the Peloponnesion War to those.
Restored to its original context, Thucydides' famous one-liner is emphatically not
an instance of a substantive Realist explanation. This ought to be evident from
the fact that it occurs in Book I of his History as the preface to actual historical
explanation, not at the end as a summary of its content. And in any case, when the
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meaning of 'power' is fleshed out, it violates several of the key premises of Realist
method. A balance of power explanation here is either substantively incorrect or a
mere banality—a double failure which, it can be argued, is the recurrent fate of
Realism as a social theory.127 Despite the chorus of assent, there is in fact no warrant
to conclude that Thucydides belongs to the Realists . . .'l:!8
Conclusions: structural conditions of raison d'etat
The Greek and Italian city-state systems were both, in their different ways, 'one-ofF
anomalies in the run of European history—incapable, despite their tremendous
political and cultural creativity, of being generalized into a wider system. If the
Commune was, as Waley suggests, 'a dead-end', the polis 'required so rare a
combination of material and institutional circumstances that i t . . . could be approxi-
mated only for a very brief period of time . . . it had a past, a fleeting present and no
future'.129 Why then do they appear so familiar to the modern international system
which, by contrast, has achieved a fully global reach? This question is perhaps best
approached via Marx's analysis, discussed above, of the structural conditions of the
capitalist 'purely political' state.
It will be recalled how Marx (in Volume III of Capital) located the cutting edge of
historical materialism as a method in historical sociology:
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct
producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled . . . It is always the direct
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers . . . which
reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the
political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding
specific form of the state.130
Capitalism is unique as a mode of production in that this relationship assumes a
'purely economic' form. That is to say, the 'specific economic form' is profit valorised
through a series of relations of exchange, rather than tribute (in money or kind)
extracted through direct political relations of domination. The commodification of
labour-power which lies at the heart of this sudden and unprecedented ubiquity of
exchange relations ('the market') does not cancel the actual subjection of the direct
producer. Rather it reconstitutes it, through the structured inequality of the labour
contract, within a privatised realm of production where it is maintained via the direct
material dependence of a free (e.g. propertyless and untied) workforce. We should
therefore be careful not to mistake the formal separation of politics and economics
(or state and civil society) under capitalism for a substantive evacuation of relations
of domination from the realm of production.131 Nevertheless, because this 'strategic
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relationship'132 is held in place by private 'economic' sanctions (unemployment)
rather than by the exercise of jurisdiction (coercively upheld legal rights of exploit-
ation as under feudalism), political inequality is not inscribed in the relations of
production—whereas it is for all precapitalist modes of production.133 This is why the
realm of 'the political' emerges both as institutionally discrete, and as potentially the
domain of universal interests. In The German Ideology, Marx summarized this in an
epigrammatic punning formula: 'the modern state . . . is based on freedom of
labour'.™ Once again, the formal separation should not confuse us—this time into
thinking that this 'purely political' 'autonomous' state is a self-sufficient, trans-
historically viable form of rule. It is not:
The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of
private life belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern
product.135
But if modern state autonomy is structurally specific to capitalism, what does it retain
in common with Italy and Greece? Much and little. As we have seen, in all three cases,
the opening out of a public sphere rests upon a formal political equality among the
citizen body. In each case too, the condition of this formal equality is the exclusion
from the mutual relations of the citizenry of political mechanisms of surplus
appropriation. It is this which allows the emergence of institutions of political
governance which are both potentially autonomous of factional interest (e.g. 'purely
political') and yet uniquely an expression of the structural and historical identity of
the society whose determinate conditions of reproduction they can have no higher
aim than to secure and promote. As the Athenians accurately put it: 'The law is
king'136—meaning both that law rules and that the laws (the constitution) are the
highest moral end of public life. The Italians averred the same when they upheld the
municipal law of the Empire even after the repulse of Hohenstauffen power from the
peninsula: 'When the Emperor was no longer recognised as superior, his place was
taken by the law'.137 But how is it that in each of our three cases, political mechanisms
of surplus appropriation, which are unquestionably the dominant form in human
history, are excluded? Here we find a crucial difference: for capitalism is the only one
in which this condition of the emergence of a discrete sphere of 'the political' is
actually internal to the mode of production.
In capitalism the domain of formal political equality does not need to be a
segregated realm of privilege resting upon surplus extraction elsewhere in the wider
social formation. Or, at any rate, this 'elsewhere' is but another dimension of the lives
of the same individuals: so far as the direct producer is concerned, the capitalist
labour contract is free and equal 'on the outside' but unfree and unequal within.
(Marx's best-known formulation of this is his contrast of the 'heaven' of political
citizenship with the 'earth' of capitalist socio-economic relations.138) To call the
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outside 'public/political' and the inside 'private/economic/civil' obscures as much as
it reveals about the character and interconnection of the social relations involved. As
Ellen Wood points out,
the differentiation of the economic and the political in capitalism is, more precisely, a
differentiation of political functions themselves and their separate allocation to the private
economic sphere and the public sphere of the state. This allocation reflects the separation of
political functions immediately concerned with the extraction and appropriation of surplus
labour from those with a more general communal purpose . . . the differentiation of the
economic is in fact a differentiation within the political sphere.139
This is indeed more accurate than the designation above of the capitalist mechanism
of surplus appropriation as 'purely economic', a description which is always in danger
also of lending credence to the misleading definition of capitalism solely in terms of
the complex of exchange relations which it presents to public (in both technical and
ordinary usages) view. None the less once these limitations to any discussion of a
'purely political' realm are accepted, it remains valid and instructive to note how the
conditions of the emergence of the latter in Italy and Greece differed from those
obtaining in modern capitalist societies.
As already suggested, in both earlier cases these conditions arose externally to the
political community involved. This is most obviously the case with the Italian
Commune, where interregional trade provided the all-important supplement to local
agrarian surpluses. The freedoms of the Commune depended on the wider unfreedom
of agrarian labour in Europe and the east; for, as Marx noted, the targets of
interregional mercantile activities in the precapitalist period are the surpluses already
appropriated and held by superordinate groups in the foreign societies between
which the traders' activities mediate.140 (What was specific to the city-states was the
additional, geopolitical dimension which they lent to this structural separation of
production and exchange.) Unlike the polis, the Italian city-state evolved a real urban
economy, but an unrepeatable one resting on its location within the wider agrarian
formation: its political antagonism towards the feudal countryside thus did not reflect
any overall transformative capacity comparable to that of its capitalist successor. But
in Greece too, it was the admixture of slavery alongside (but institutionally outside)
the dominant mode of production which provided the basis for 'the separation of
political functions immediately concerned with the extraction and appropriation of
surplus labour from those with a more general communal purpose'.141 Greece too was
'freakish' in this regard; and this makes it apparent that in both cases the external
conditions enabling the emergence of a distinct political sphere themselves set internal
structural limits to its expansion and hence generalisability.M In Italy the public
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sphere was bordered 'horizontally' by (and depended upon) the surrounding feudal
rural institutions; in Greece, its delineation was the 'vertical' one of citizenship versus
slavery. And because in both cases the city was the locus and mechanism of the
political sphere, the differences between them (and those which set the modern world
apart again) can be expressed by tracing the modulation in the overall relationship of
town and country, as indeed Marx indicated in the Grundrissse:
Ancient classical history is the history of cities, but cities based on landownership and
agriculture . . . the Middle Ages... starts with the countryside as the locus of history, whose
further development then proceeds through the opposition of town and country; modern
(history) is the urbanisation of the countryside, not, as among the ancients, the ruralisation
of the city.143
We cannot leave this discussion without suggesting briefly what lines of further
research are indicated for theories of the international system. Two related avenues
suggest themselves immediately: extending the critique of the Realist theory of the
state to cover its conception of the state-system; and demystifying the institutional
forms of contemporary international power. A single example may serve to illuminate
what might be involved in both directions.
The twentieth century has witnessed, among many other things, both the end of
colonialism and a significant contraction of the developed, privileged core of the
world economy. (Hobsbawm, reckoning the latter as a proportion of the world's
population, estimates a decline from 33 per cent to 15 per cent between 1900 and
1990 144) At ,-jjg v e r v i e a s t j t WJU b e a c c epted that the achievement of formal sovereign
equality between states has streaked far ahead of any prospect of material equality
between populations—even in the provision of basic human needs. The United
Nations as an organization is emblematic of this paradox. Is then the sovereign
equality which it proclaims an indictment of the hollowness of formal political rights,
or, is it a sign of hope—a potential lever of universal future advances?145 Ultimately,
of course, this question will admit only of historical answers. But our discussion
above does enable us to go beyond the despairing cynicism or rootless utopianism
which it usually provokes. For we can see that sovereign equality and the right of
self-determination are attended by the same combination of genuine, hard-won
achievement and cruel ironies of dispossession which has dogged the struggle for the
juridical equality and political freedom of the individual within the liberal democratic
state.
This is because the two realms (domestic and international) manifest common
structural properties given by their shared capitalist identity: in the international
sphere too, the absolute character of the political right of self-determination (like the
freedom of labour/the individual) may be seen to hinge precisely upon its substantive
permeability by other, 'non-political' mechanisms of surplus appropriation. Capital-
ism is the only historical system which permits the exploitation of productive labour
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under an alien jurisdiction. But, as we have already seen, the 'privatizing' of surplus
appropriation which allows this is at the same time the 'abstracting' of the state as a
'purely political' public institution. The possibility of an international economy is
thus structurally interdependent with the possibility of a sovereign state-system. At
the institutional level, however, this same interdependence manifests itself precisely as
a separating out of international politics and international economics.146
The community of nations too thus has its public 'heaven' (the sovereign state-
system) and its private 'earth' (the transnational global economy). To put it in these
terms is not to indicate a ready-made causal model capable of automatically
producing explanations of historical outcomes. The point is not that 'earth deter-
mines heaven' in the manner of the vulgar marxist formulations which have for so
long been the butt of easy criticism. It is that these institutional realms are no more
capable of being understood separately from each other than are their equivalents
'within' the state, discussed in the body of this paper above. Thus if we set out to
construct a theory of international politics, it is futile to proceed from the Realist idea
of a generic state-system (studied by IR) on the one hand, and a global economy of
market relations (studied by Economics) on the other—the two spheres reciprocally
linked by a set of causal relationships constituting the further field of International
Political Economy. Rather, at this level too we must explore what is involved in seeing
the essence of capitalism not as the separation of politics and economics which it
presents to view, but as 'a differentiation within the political sphere'.
It should be added that to speak of a capitalist state-system is not to foreclose the
associated historical debates concerning the dynamics and agency of socio-political
development and transformation, either in early modern Europe or elsewhere: on the
contrary, even in England, the social relations we have been discussing did not emerge
suddenly and fully-fledged but rather evolved, often bloodily, in the course of several
centuries. And if it makes sense to describe the modern international system as
capitalist, this is not because all its members are assumed to have followed the same
path; it is because its dominant institutions have been shaped by liberal states in a way
that facilitates the international exercise of capitalist social power. To explore
theoretically the capitalist character of this system is indeed to trace the specificity of
the dominant modern form of international power. But the contingent historical
processes by which this sovereign state-system came into being, and by which it
continues to develop and to be reproduced by real living individuals—these processes
remain to be recounted and explained. History, hence the need for historical
explanation, does not end. In this respect, the conclusions reached here do nothing
more than probe the broadest contours of an alternative, non-Realist terrain of IR
theory.
On the other hand, even at this range they may throw some light on the paradox of
universal sovereign equality overseeing a global deepening of material inequality—
the paradox summed up in the United Nations Organization. For they suggest that to
regard the UN either as a failure for not actualising substantive international rights
(sometimes known as social and economic rights), or as in principle limited only by
the collective will of its members in its potential as an agent of unversal interests—
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that both these conclusions implicitly misread the specificity of political institutions
under capitalism. For the very possibility of sovereign equality is, as we have seen,
dependent on the abstraction of the purely political state-system which creates the
realm of private transnational power (the world market) in which, in turn, the
material inequality is reproduced.
Thus even if, for the sake of argument, all the world's governments were political
democracies and the UN constituted a world assembly wielding executive authority
determined by majority voting, there is no special reason to believe that it would
become the irresistible protagonist of 'economic rights', if this means instituting a
planned development which suppresses the complex operation of the world market.
This kind of thinking once promoted the delusion (on both right and left) that
capitalism would be overwhelmed by universal suffrage.
This does not mean that progressive international political or redistributive
advances cannot be achieved via the UN—any more than one would wish undone the
political and material benefits of social democracy in Western Europe. But if our
historical review teaches us anything, it is that democracy, slogan of our epoch, has
no determinate content until its structural conditions are specified. Its historical
definition always requires that we extend our focus beyond the self-definition of
the political realm. In the case of our other historical examples, this revealed an
insurmountable dependence upon forms of political unfreedom elsewhere in the
social formation. In the case of the modern international system, sovereign equality
may be seen to rest on conditions ('economic' unfreedoms) which set internal limits
that capitalism is structurally incapable of transcending.147 Paradoxical this may
seem; inexplicable it is not: 'The representative system is a very specific product of
modern bourgeois society which is as inseparable from the latter as is the isolated
individual of modern times.'148
And this, it should be clear, is not a conspiracy theory, or an 'economic
reductionism': it is a straightforward argument about the determinacy and effectivity
of social structure.
At first sight, the remarkable institutional similarities between the Classical,
Renaissance and modern state-systems do indeed seem to offer the basis for a
transhistorical theory of state-systems sui generis, which can be elaborated fully at the
interstate level in terms of the distinctive discourse of raison d'etat common to all
three. It is no wonder therefore that many Realists look to Italy as the dawn of the
modern system and to Classical Greece as evidence of the timelessness of those
properties which they single out as sui generis and hence the starting point of their
theory of the modern state-system. On closer inspection, however, this transhistorical
continuity resolves into a gigantic optical illusion: for it becomes apparent first that
in reality the three systems are utterly different in character, second that in no case
(least of all the causes of the Peloponnesian War) can an adequate explanation of
actual historical outcomes be derived solely at the interstate level, and third that the
very appearance of a self-sufficient purely political realm itself rests upon an internal
(and in each case different) structural configuration of social relations. Once these
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differentia specifica are isolated, they provide an alternative and surer starting point
from which to explore the historical character of the geopolitical systems concerned.
Dispelling an optical illusion is not always a straightforward affair: for it is
necessary not only to show how reality has been distorted but also to explain why the
illusion recurrently arises. And the task is still not complete until an alternative
explanation is fully elaborated which can be seen to illuminate more about the social
processes and outcomes under view. But that even the preliminary conclusions
reached here constitute an advance on Realism is surely not to be doubted. For
Realism is not only incapable of identifying, let alone explaining, the optical illusion:
it positively embraces it, and elevates it to the level of a general theory embodying the
acknowledged common sense of the age. This self-confidence lends Realism a
resilience far greater than its intellectual credentials could warrant. But then,
international relations would hardly be the first discipline in which basic theoretical
advances have needed to be made in the face of common sense.
